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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
DEPRECIATION OF IMPROVED REAL PROPERTY IN TRUST ESTATES
Whenever a trust is created, the income beneficiaries are interested in the
production of trust income and the remaindermen are interested in the main-
tenance of the corpus of the trust. The trustee, whose duty it is to act in the best
interests of these parties, generally has little trouble in determining what charges
are properly allocable to income and to principal.
Income ordinarily includes so much of the return produced by the res that
does not impair principal. Interest, cash dividends, rents and produce of land, as
well as profits of a business, are, therefore, only treated as income after deducting
the charges and expenses that arose in producing these receipts.1 For the most
part, the ordinary expenses of maintaining and operating trust property are payable
out of income.2  Such proper charges in New York and other Anierican juris-
dictions are taxes, insurance premiums, ordinary repairs and interest upon indebted-
ness.3 However, where the trust corpus consists of improved real property,
trustees experience no little difficulty as to the proper beneficial interest which
should be charged with depreciation.
Depreciation is usually defined as the loss due to all such factors as wear and
tear, decay and obsolescence which is not restored by current repairs and ordinary
maintenance of the property. It is a systematic attempt to spread the cost of
tangible property over the years of its expected life Generally, the decisions in
the United States indicate that in the absence of an express direction in the trust
instrument, the trustee is under no duty to the remainderman to set aside a
depreciation reserve for improved real property, and, in fact, he owes a duty to the
income beneficiaries not to charge depreciation as an expense.5
The test in New York seems to be one of intent. If the trust instrument
contains an express provision as to depreciation, there is, of course, no problem.
1. Restatement, Trusts sec. 233 (1935); 2 Scott, Trusts sec. 233.1, 233.3 (1939);
Uniform Principal and Income Act sec. 12 (1931).
2. Matter of Albertson, 113 N. Y. 434, 21 N. E. 117 (1889); Restatement. Trusts
sec. 233 comment e (1935); Uniform Principal and Income Act sec. 12 (1931).
3. Matter of Albertson, spra;" Spencer v. Spencer, -Misc. 183 N. Y.
Supp. 870 (Sup. Ct., 1920); Matter of Cronise, 167 Misc. 310, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 392
(Surr. Ct, 1937); and other cases cited 128 A. L. R. 199 (1940); 175 A. L. R. 1434
(1948).
4. See Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 292 U. S. 151, 167 (1934);
Accounting Research Bulletin No. 22 (1944).
5. 2 Scott, Trusts sec. 239.4 (1939); Evans v. Oclcerhauten 69 App. D. C. 285,
100 F. (2d) 695 (1938), cert. denied 306 U. S. 633 (1939); Freuler v. Helvering, 291
U. s. 35 (1934); Matter of Roth's Estate 139 N. J. Eq. 588, 52 A (2d) 811 (1947);
Chapin v. Collard 29 Wash. (2d) 788, 189 P (2d) 642 (1948).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Where there is no express provision, depreciation may be charged against income
only if the creator intended that result, and his intent is to be determined from the
instrument construed "under all the circumstances and 'in the light of his prior
practice." 8 Absent the showing of any intent, it may be fairly stated that the rule
presumes that the testator or settlor did not wish that depreciation be charged
against income.7 New York has recognized an exception to this rule where the
property is used in a "going business." 8
In two recent cases, this general rule has not been followed. Matter of
Kaplan -' decided by Surrogate McGarey of King's County in May, 1949, held that
it is the duty of a trustee to deduct depreciation of improved real property from
income unless the trust instrument or will has specifically directed otherwise. The
same result could probably have been reached by construction of testator's intent
under the general rule. He had, during his life, deducted depreciation in the
amount of 2% annually for income tax purposes. There was other evidence that
he intended the charge be made in that the will authorized the trustee to pay the
net annual income "after making proper and suitable allowance for expenses and
setting up a reserve or sinking fund to meet taxes or other contingencies." Also,
it would have been easy to bring the result under the "going business" exception.
The property involved was several parcels of land improved with apartment houses.
For many years prior to his death, testators sole occupation was holding and
managing the multiple dwellings for investment purposes. The Court, however,
unequivocally stated at page 145 that "the obligation and right to charge deprecia-
tion against gross rents is not dependent either upon the wording of the will or
trust instrument or the nature of the business in which the decedent was engaged."
The opinion concludes, "in the absence of a definite direction to the contrary, it is
the fiduciary's duty to establish such a depreciation reserve." In October of the
same year, Surrogate McGarey, in the same type of case cited and followed the
Kaplan case.10 These two cases cast doubt on the validity of the New York rule,
supra.
6. Matter of Chapman 32 Misc. 187, 66 N. Y. Supp. 235 (Surr. Ct., 1900), aff'd
59 App. Div. 624, 69 N. Y. Supp. 1131 (3rd Dept. 1901), aff'd 167 N. Y. 619, 60 N. E.
1108 (1901); Matter of Adler 164 Misc. 544, 299 N. Y. Supp. 542 (Surr. Ct., 1937);
In re Ottman's Estate 197 Misc. 645, 95 N. Y. S. (2d) 151 (Surr. Ct., 1949); In re
Davies Estate 197 Misc. 827, 96 N. Y. S. (2d) 191 (Surr. Ct., 1950), aff'd 277 App.
Div. 1025, 100 N. Y. S. (2d) 710 (1st Dept., 1950); In re Baurs Will, 197 Misc. 1047,
96 N. Y. S. (2d) 201 (Surr. Ct, 1950); Report of Law Revision Commission, Legisla-
tive Document No. 65-0, 1950.
7. Mattel' of Adler, supra.
8. Matter of Edgar 157 Misc. 10, 282 N. Y. Supp. 795 (Surr. Ct., 1935).
9. 195 Misc. 132, 88 N. Y. S. (2d) 851 (Surr. Ct., 1949).
10. In re Dahlman's Estate -Miisc.- , 95 N. Y. S. (2d) 74 (Surr. Ct.,
1949).
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The next two cases on this point are Matter of Ottmann, decided December
30, 1949," and Matter of Davies, decided February 3, 1950. 12 In the former,
Surrogate Collins sets out the general New York rule and follows the older cases.
In the latter at page 834, the Surrogate says: "A rule that has been so long accepted
is not to be discarded readily or nullified by tenuous distinctions. Upon the
assumption that the court decisions mean what they explicitly say, wills have been
made, trusts have been administered, beneficiaries and fiduciaries have been given
legal counsel. If, during all these years, trustees have nevertheless been bound to
maintain reserves to offset depreciation of real property, no hint of the duty has
been made in judicial decisions. If that duty exists and has not been performed,
countless trustees would now face large surcharges." Surrogate Buscaglia of Erie
County in Matter of Ball, decided April 5, 1950,1: followed the decisions of
Surrogate Collins in Matter of Ottmann and Matter of Davies.
The New York courts have advanced various arguments to justify their
position on depreciation. Possibly, the strongest one is that the life beneficiary is
normally the principal object of the testator's bounty.14 However, cases may arise
where it would-be apparent that the value of the trust estate will become insufficient
to produce income before the termination of the trust unless some provision is
made to restore the corpus. It is questionable whether the exhaustion of the source
of income in this manner was contemplated. Also, the creator must have had
some concern for the remainderman, else he would have given the property in fee
to the income beneficiary. Again, if the life beneficiary is young when the trust
begins he may very well need a depreciation reserve to protect the income in his
older age. If the life beneficiary is old at the beginning of the trust it may be
doubted that he is the principal object of the creator's bounty.
A second argument usually made is that the remainderman benefits from any
appreciation in value of the corpus and therefore should stand the loss caused by
depreciation.' 5 However, any gain by appreciation depends on the status of the
market at the time of sale, something uncertain. This argument is also not tenable
when it is considered that the purpose of depreciation is to provide a reserve for
exhaustion and wear and tear from age. This process goes on constantly regardless
of market value fluctuations produced by economic factors. Theoretically, at least,
economic appreciation of the trust res will probably be reflected in an increase of
income to the life beneficiary anyway.
11. In re Ottmann's Estate, supra.
12. In re Davies Estate, supra.
13. In re Ball's WiN, supra.
14. Matter of Chapman, Matter of Adler, supra.
15. Matter of Edgar, supra.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Finally, courts say that the difficulty of predicting the life of a building would
place too heavy a burden upon the trustee or would make the result too uncer-
tain.ic Consistent and accepted business practices, however, recognize deprecia-
tion as a valid charge in determining income. The straight line method of depreci-
ation is not only accepted in the business world, but trustees are also allowed to use
this or other methods in computing income for tax purposes. 7
In situations closely akin to the problem under consideration the New York
courts have not seen fit to follow the general rule. In Matter of Jones,18 the court
allowed a deduction from income for depreciation of personal property used by
trustees in carrying on the testator's business. Again, where improvements on real
property, whose probable life will not -extend beyond the duration of the life interest
are paid for out of corpus the courts have held that income may properly be
charged with annual depreciation unless the testator directs otherwise.' 9 Finally,
if the corpus of a trust is made up of "wasting assets," those which are actually
consumed in the production of income viz. oil wells, mines, quarries, etc., New
York does a turnabout and presumes that the creator of the trust did not intend
that the corpus be so destroyed but rather that it be kept intact. Therefore the
income therefrom must be charged with a sufficient amount to so retain the
corpus.20 This presumption, of course, is readily overcome by testator's intent to
the contrary.21 Scott points out that the difference between improved real property
and "wasting assets" is a difference in degree, not a difference in kind.
2
From the foregoing it is apparent that trustees in New York may frequently
be in a quandary when the question of depreciation of improved real property
confronts them. The problem of determining intent from ambiguous words and
surrounding circumstances places a heavy burden on trustees, one that could and
should be dispelled. The seeming exception where the property is used in a "going
business," affords little help, for it presents a serious question of fact requiring
determination in a judicial proceeding.
Since a trustee owes a duty to both the income beneficiary and the remainder-
16. See Matter of Chapmann, Matter of Edgar, supra.
17. U. S. Treasury Regulation No. 111.
18. Matter of Jones, 103 N. Y. 621, 9 N. E. 493, 57 Arm Rep. 775 (1886).
19. Restatement, Trusts see. 233, comment e; Matter of Adler supra.
20. Matter of Housman, 4 Dem. Sur. 404 (N. Y. 1886); Frankel v. Farmers
Loan & Trust Co., 152 App. Div. 58, 136 N. Y. Supp. 703 (1st Dept., 1912), alf'd
209 N. Y. 553, 103 N. E. 1124 (1913); Matter of Elsner, 210 App. Div. 575, 206 N. Y.
Supp. 765 (4th. Dept., 1924); Matter of Hall's Estate, 130 Misc. 313, 224 N. Y.
Supp. 376 (Surr. Ct., 1927). See also 2 Scott, Trusts see. 239; Restatement, Trusts
see. 239, comment a.
21. Matter of Hal's Estate, supra.
22. 2 Scott, Trusts see. 239, 239.4.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
man of a trust he may be liable to surcharge even though he acted under a mistake
of law as to the extent of his powers and duties notwithstanding that he acted on
the advice of counseL3 Consequently, as the situation now stands, a trustee is in
many cases, forced into court for a judicial construction of the will or instrument in
order that he may be adequately protected.
In the Kaplan case, supra, it seems an attempt was made to change and make
certain the rule in New York. In the past it has been the policy of the legislature
to resolve questions of testator's intent, to simplify the administration of estates and
to save expense to the beneficial interests. 24 Therefore, it is submitted that
remedial legislation is called for in order that the necessity of judicial proceedings
to apprise the trustee of the course of action he should pursue be substantially
reduced, that the difficulties encountered in the application of the general rule of
intent be resolved and finally that the question whether the pre-Kaplan rule
prevails today or not be answered.
When such legislation is enacted, it should provide that deduction for depre-
ciation of improved real property in trust estates must be made and charged
against income according to regular accounting practice, unless the testator
expressly provides otherwise. Trusts are predominantly created by that type of
person who has considerable means and who has had substantial business dealings.
Consequently, more likely than not he would intend that proper deductions for
depreciation be made against income. Lastly, since "Trustees are bound in the
management of all the matters of the trust to act in good faith and employ such
vigilance, sagacity, diligence and prudence as in general prudent men of discretion
and intelligence in like matters employ in their own affairs," 25 trustees should be
required to act as prudent business men in all trust matters without exception.
Thomas J. Kelly
John G. Wick
23. 2 Scott, Trusts sec. 201.
24. New York Pers. Prop. Law sec. 17.
25. Costello v. Costello, 152 App. Div. 280, 137 N. Y. Supp. 132 (4th. Dept.,
1912), aff'd 209 N. Y. 252, 261, 103 N. E. 148 (1913).
